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ABSTRACT: Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works characterises and explores one democratically problematic kind of 
propaganda, ‘undermining propaganda’, which involves ‘[a] contribution to public discourse that is presented 
as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals’. Stanley’s model for 
how undermining propaganda functions is Rae Langton and Caroline West’s treatment of moves in porno-
graphic language games. However, Stanley doesn’t consider whether his theory of propaganda might in turn il-
luminate the harmful nature of pornography, in light of the familiar contention that some pornography acts as 
a kind of misogynistic propaganda. Drawing on Catharine MacKinnon’s writings on pornography, this paper 
will explore one way of developing the claim that pornography sometimes functions as undermining propa-
ganda, in something close to Stanley’s sense. Moreover, I will suggest that the discussion points to a new re-
sponse to the so-called authority problem for Rae Langton’s silencing argument against the protected status 
of pornography.
Keywords: Propaganda, pornography, ideology, silencing, authority.
RESUMEN: El libro de Jason Stanley How Propaganda Works caracteriza y explora un tipo de propaganda democrática-
mente problemático, la ‘propaganda debilitadora’, que envuelve ‘[una] contribución al discurso público que se 
presenta como si incorporase determinados ideales, pero que es de un tipo que tiende a erosionar esos mismos 
ideales’. El modelo de Stanley para el funcionamiento de la propaganda debilitadora es el del tratamiento de 
los movimientos en los juegos de lenguaje pornográficos debido a Rae Langton y Caroline West. Sin embargo, 
Stanley no reflexiona acerca de si su teoría sobre la propaganda podría, a su vez, iluminar la dañina naturaleza de 
la pornografía, a la luz de la conocida tesis de que hay pornografía que actúa como una forma de propaganda mi-
sógina. A partir de los trabajos de Catharine MacKinnon sobre pornografía, este artículo pretende explorar una 
forma de desarrollar la tesis de que la pornografía funciona en ocasiones como propaganda debilitadora, en un 
sentido próximo al de Stanley. Además, sugeriré que la discusión apunta a una nueva respuesta al llamado pro-
blema de la autoridad en relación con el argumento del silenciamiento debido a Rae Langton en contra de un 
estatuto de protección para la pornografía.
Palabras clave: propaganda, pornografía, ideología, silenciamiento, autoridad.
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330 Aidan McGlynn
Theoria 31/3 (2016): 329-343
‘[T]he pictures are not so different from the words and drawings that came before, but your 
use for the camera gives the picture a special credibility, a deep verisimilitude, an even stronger 
claim to truth, to being incontrovertibly about you, because they happened and there you are.’ 
(MacKinnon 1994: 4)
Introduction
Jason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works characterizes and explores one democratically 
problematic kind of propaganda, ‘undermining propaganda’, which involves ‘[a] contri-
bution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a 
kind that tends to erode those very ideals’ (2015: 53). Stanley’s model for how undermin-
ing propaganda functions is Rae Langton and Caroline West’s treatment of moves in por-
nographic language games; however, for reasons we’ll come to shortly, Stanley doesn’t con-
sider whether his theory of propaganda might in turn illuminate the harmful nature of 
pornography. In light of the familiar contention that some pornography acts as a kind of 
misogynistic propaganda (e.g. Brownmiller 1975, Langton 1990, Langton 2012a), this pa-
per will explore the claim that pornography sometimes functions as undermining propa-
ganda, in something close to Stanley’s sense.
In particular, I’ll suggest that Stanley’s work on propaganda gives us a new framework 
in which to understand and assess some well-known views and arguments due to Catharine 
MacKinnon and her philosophical defenders. I’ll proceed by outlining a heavily MacKin-
non-inspired way in which some pornography can be seen to meet Stanley’s characteriza-
tion of undermining propaganda: it can be presented as embodying the ideals of equality 
and autonomy while systematically subordinating, or tending to lead to the subordination 
of, women.
A second task of the paper is to begin to assess the implications of the claim that some 
pornography is a kind of undermining propaganda for issues concerning silencing. The 
entrenched, orthodox liberal position on pornography is that it ought to be protected 
as free speech. There are (at least) two ways that a defense of the claim that pornogra-
phy is propaganda might contribute to unsettling that protected status. First, Stanley has 
suggested that quite generally undermining propaganda should be subject to some re-
strictions, given its democratically problematic nature. Second, the claim that some por-
nography is undermining propaganda might help to advance challenges specifically to por-
nography’s status as protected speech. This paper focuses on the second strategy rather 
than the first. Stanley’s proposal that undermining propaganda may need to be restricted 
is general, turning on the democratically-problematic nature of undermining propaganda 
as such, rather than on the nature of pornography in particular, and I want to remain 
more narrowly focused here. Moreover, the particular argument against the protected sta-
tus of pornography that I will focus on, the so-called silencing argument, has been thought 
to enjoy unique strengths. In rough outline, the argument tries to show that pornography 
silences women in ways that are incompatible with their right to freedom of speech. Ron-
ald Dworkin goes as far as to claim that this is the only kind of argument against the pro-
tected status of pornography that has any prospects at all (1991: 198). This claim is over-
stated (see e.g. Langton 1993: 30 and 1990), but the more modest claim that an argument 
of this kind might be particularly powerful is plausible, since it suggests that even if one 
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regards freedom of speech as trumping other ideals, it’s still not clear that pornography 
should be protected.12
My proposal will be that conceiving of some pornography as misogynistic undermin-
ing propaganda helps with what’s sometimes called the authority problem for the silencing 
argument. In essentials, the problem is that Langton’s account of how pornography silences 
women requires the premise that pornography is authoritative, in a sense that explains how 
it can set the rules for which speech acts can be performed by women in sexual language 
games. However, a number of Langton’s critics (e.g. Green 1998 and Bauer 2006) have 
contended that it’s not clear what kind of authority this could be, nor that pornography 
possesses it. Philosophers sympathetic to the silencing argument have adopted various dif-
ferent responses to the authority problem, some of which take the problem head on and try 
to show that pornography does possess the relevant kind of authority, and others which try 
to advance the argument while rejecting Langton’s claim that it rests on the premise that 
pornography is authoritative. My proposal here will be of the first kind; I’ll suggest that 
MacKinnon is fruitfully read as describing a propagandic mechanism operative in much 
pornography which points to a novel account of the kind of authority that such pornogra-
phy possesses.
Preliminaries
Before I offer the MacKinnon-inspired argument for holding that some pornography is 
undermining propaganda, I need to address three preliminaries. First, I need to say some-
thing about what I take pornography to be in this context. Second, I want to briefly lay 
out Langton’s silencing argument against the status of pornography as protected speech in 
a bit more detail, since as will already be clear from the introduction, it provides much of 
the context for the present discussion. Finally, I want to consider the relationship between 
Stanley’s project in his book and work by Langton and her co-authors, since doing so will 
1 A second reason for taking the silencing argument to be particularly significant has sometimes been of-
fered (e.g. Langton 1993: 47, 59). This is the worry that one context in which women are silenced is 
in protesting against pornography and exposing the harms involved in its production and availability, 
and this suggests that the harms of pornography cannot be countered with more speech, in the manner 
that Mill envisioned in his classic defense of the value of free speech. However, I’m not convinced that 
this really does provide a second motivation for a focus on the silencing argument. As Langton frames 
it, the worry is based almost entirely on the fact that Ordeal, Linda Boreman’s biography in which she 
reveals the dire circumstances involved in the making of Deep Throat, has sometimes been sold as more 
pornography. However, this doesn’t show that in general attempts to protest pornography will be si-
lenced, nor does a deeply inappropriate reception by certain audiences show that Ordeal itself was not 
widely received as an act of protest (as Langton concedes: see 1993: 56 fn52). So even if the silenc-
ing argument is successful, I doubt it shows that pornography cannot be countered with more speech 
(though of course there may be other arguments for that conclusion). As Langton notes (1993: 47), 
the case for any kind of censorship may rely on the latter claim, and so this point is not without signifi-
cance for our assessment of interest of the silencing argument and its relation to issues concerning free 
speech. It’s worth remembering, however, that though Langton glosses over this point (1993: 25 fn1), 
very few anti-pornography feminists actually advocate censorship in anything like the usual sense (see 
Finlayson 2016: 153-4 for useful discussion).
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enable me to be clearer about my aims in this paper and the extent to which they overlap 
with and differ from Stanley’s analysis of propagandic language.
First, pornography. The characterization standardly adopted by opponents of pornog-
raphy’s protected status is due to MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin:
We define pornography as the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pic-
tures or words […] (MacKinnon 1987: 176)
This definition is controversial, largely for the claim that pornography doesn’t merely de-
pict or encourage the subordination of women, but is actually a form of subordination 
itself. I’m sympathetic to Langton’s argument for thinking that the controversial claim 
makes perfect sense, even when taken literally, and that it may well be true (Langton 1993). 
However, as Langton explicitly notes (e.g. 1993: 44-6), her argument rests on the premise 
that pornography is authoritative, and as I noted in the introduction, one of my tasks in 
this paper is precisely to assess the plausibility of this premise. Given this, it seems inappro-
priate to define our subject matter from the outset in a manner that pre-judges the issue of 
pornography’s authority.2 Instead, I’ll take pornography to be the graphic sexually explicit 
depiction of the subordination of women in images or words, and I’ll remain neutral here 
on the further claim that pornography itself subordinates.
Let us turn now to the silencing argument. MacKinnon’s work offers a sustained at-
tempt to try to make good on the premise that pornography silences women in a way that 
violates their freedom of speech (e.g. 1987, 1994). Moreover, much recent feminist philos-
ophy of language has been an attempt to defend MacKinnon’s argument from charges of 
confusion, and perhaps even to show that it can be rendered compelling. In particular, Rae 
Langton and Jennifer Hornsby have appealed to J. L. Austin’s (1975) three-way distinc-
tion between locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts in order to ad-
vance versions of MacKinnon’s argument (e.g. Langton 1993, Hornsby 1993, Hornsby and 
Langton 1998).
Take the sentence ‘Fire her’.3 In uttering this sentence, I may be doing all kinds of 
things, but Austin suggested that we focus on three kinds of speech act that I may be per-
forming in making my utterance. First, taken in its context, I will typically be perform-
ing a locutionary act; I utter a particular sentence with a certain content or meaning (Aus-
tin 1975: 94). I will also normally be performing an illocutionary act. That’s to say, I’ll be 
attaching a certain force to the content of my utterance, and my audience will not have 
wholly understood my utterance if they fail to recognize its illocutionary force: if my utter-
ance fails to secure uptake, in Austin’s terminology (1975: 117). Returning to our example, 
my utterance of ‘Fire her’ might be a recommendation or a command, and the locutionary 
act I perform doesn’t determine which. Sometimes it’ll be immediately apparent which il-
locutionary act I’m performing, while other times there will be some detective-work to be 
done, drawing on my tone of voice, body language, mutual knowledge about our respective 
positions of authority (for example, whether I’m placed to give you an order), and so on. 
However, such clues can misled: ‘coming from him, I took it as an order, not as a request’ 
(Austin 1975: 76). Finally, we have perlocutionary acts; the effects on one’s audience that 
2 Though see Finlayson 2016: 140-1.
3 Modified from Austin 1975: 101-2.
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one hopes to bring about that go beyond mere uptake; if things go well (for me), I will have 
persuaded you to fire her in making my utterance, for example.
On the face of it, neither locutionary nor perlocutionary acts offer us a notion of 
‘speech’ that can underwrite an argument against the protected status of pornography. 
There’s little reason to suppose that pornography systematically leads to the silencing of 
women when we conceive of this as women being prevented from performing the locution-
ary acts that they intend to. What Langton calls ‘perloctionary frustration’, in contrast, in-
volves being unable to bring about the effects that one intends to in one’s audience. It’s per-
haps plausible that pornography does contribute to the perlocutionary silencing of women 
when they refuse sex, though as Langton observes, ‘“Perlocutionary frustration” is too meek 
and academic a label for what is simple rape’ (1993: 54). But devastating as perlocutionary 
frustration can be, it’s standardly thought that there is little plausibility in the claim that it 
involves violation of one’s freedom of speech.4
More promising, Hornsby and Langton suggest, is to focus on freedom of speech as the 
right to perform certain illocutionary acts.5 Illocutionary acts are the things that we do with 
words; freedom of speech is freedom to perform such acts, and not merely to speak the words 
one wants to speak. Moreover, a case can be—and indeed has been—made that pornogra-
phy silences women in this sense. In its most troubling form, the central idea is that pornog-
raphy can prevent a woman’s attempted sexual refusal from achieving uptake; uttering the 
word ‘No’ is not taken as a refusal (but rather as a coy way of flirting, perhaps). If one takes 
update to be a necessary condition on having performed a given illocutionary act (Austin 
1975: 117), then this means that the woman will not be able to refuse.6 Since Austin’s claim 
that performing an illocutionary act requires that one secures uptake has been disputed (e.g. 
Jacobsen 1995, Bird 2002), a perhaps more plausible line is that in the circumstances in ques-
tion, a woman’s refusal cannot be fully successful, since she cannot secure uptake (Hornsby 
1993, Langton and Hornsby 1998). Whether one accepts Austin’s premise that performing 
an illocutionary act requires uptake or not, the crucial contention seems to be that freedom of 
speech includes a right to have at least a reasonable chance of securing uptake for one’s illocu-
tionary acts, but that in certain circumstances pornography can interfere with a women’s abil-
ity to have even a reasonable chance of securing uptake when refusing sex.
Stanley’s treatment of how undermining propaganda works draws on recent work in se-
mantics and pragmatics in order to improve on Langton and West’s (1999) account of moves 
in pornographic language games, which they advance as a contribution to the silencing argu-
ment. Langton and West’s project is to explain how pornography can have the illocutionary 
force of ranking women as inferior to men, as Langton (1993) proposes, despite the fact that 
this isn’t something that is typically explicitly said—either because it’s left as subtext, or be-
cause we’re dealing with images which don’t explicitly say anything. Langton and West’s pro-
posal is that utterances and images can pragmatically presuppose propositions, in something 
like the sense discussed and illuminated in David Lewis’s classic ‘Scorekeeping in a Language 
4 See, for example, Jacobson 1995 and Bird 2002: 2.
5 Jacobson takes Hornsby and Langton’s claim here to be that one has a right to perform any illocution-
ary act one wishes in any circumstances (1995: 76); in their joint reply, Langton and Hornsby clarify 
that they do not endorse this claim (1998: 85). See Maitra (2009) for insightful discussion.
6 As Langton and Hornsby point out (1998: 83) in response to Jacobsen, to say that a women is unable 
to refuse sex is not to say that she has consented.
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Game’ (1979). Moreover, Langton and West note that presupposed content often isn’t sub-
ject to the same degree of scrutiny as asserted content, and can be more difficult to challenge 
(1999: 182), which may go some way to explaining how pornography’s harmful messages 
might have an influence even on people who consciously hold feminist ideals.
One of the main achievements of How Propaganda Works comes in chapter 4, where 
Stanley builds on Langton and West’s account of pornographic language games in order 
to give a precise and worked out account of how an utterance could present itself as an em-
bodiment of a certain liberal ideal while tending to undermine that very ideal. I won’t go 
into the details here, but the general idea is that some words act as ‘code words’ in politi-
cal discourse, and these introduce problematic contents into such discourse even when they 
are used to make claims that embody the democratic ideals that the content associated with 
the code word tends to undermine; through the presence of these ‘code words’ the at-issue 
content introduces not-at-issue content which, as Langton and West claimed about presup-
positions, is subject to less scrutiny and harder to challenge.7 So, for example, through the 
manipulations of the media, the word ‘welfare’ introduces the content that Black people 
are lazy when mentioned in the context of American political discourse (2015: 138), and 
it does so even when it’s mentioned as part of a claim that on the face of it affirms equal re-
spect for all. This is so whether the intention of the speaker is to surreptitiously undermine 
the ideal in question, or to genuinely affirm the ideal-embodying at-issue content.
Despite taking Langton and West’s treatment of pornography as a model in this fash-
ion, Stanley doesn’t apply the resulting account to the case of pornography itself. Though 
Stanley doesn’t discuss this explicitly, it is easy to discern some of the reasons why pornog-
raphy wouldn’t make a good case study for him, and reflecting on these reasons will enable 
me to better situate my own project with respect to Stanley’s. The first reason that por-
nography isn’t a good case for Stanley is that his definition of undermining propaganda fo-
cuses on what he calls ‘public political discourse’ which he characterizes as ‘discourse that is 
in some sense official, and that takes place in the context that are official contexts of pub-
lic political claims, which depend on the political system in question’ (2015: 52, italics in 
original). Clearly, our focus on pornography takes us away from such discourse; this is why 
when introducing the topic of this paper above, I hedged the claim that pornography is un-
dermining propaganda.
There’s a bigger and potentially more puzzling question here too, namely whether por-
nography could possibly count as political propaganda, of the sort that interests Stanley. On 
the one hand, most pornography isn’t intended to be a contribution to political debate, 
whether public or private. On the other hand, Stanley also characterizes political propa-
ganda as ‘propaganda that exploits political ideals, rather than other kinds of ideals’ (2015: 
56), and I’ll argue below that the ideals that pornography invokes and betrays are indeed 
political ones. So in this important sense, pornography might be political propaganda, even 
if it doesn’t involve a contribution to public or private political discourse.
The principal reason that pornography wouldn’t have made a suitable case study for 
Stanley’s account is that he is concerned with speech, and most contemporary pornogra-
7 For the distinction between at-issue and not-at-issue content, see Stanley 2015: 134-5, and see 2015: 
137 for why Stanley doesn’t equate the notion of not-at-issue content with that of pragmatically pre-
supposed content.
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phy takes the form of images: pictures or videos. Now, despite this focus, Stanley does in-
tend his characterizations of the various sorts of propaganda he discusses to include images 
as well as linguistic utterances. However, he doesn’t think that one can readily apply his ac-
count of how propagandic language works to images, since he’s not sure that the crucial dis-
tinction between at-issue and not-at-issue content applies to images, and as a result, he re-
stricts his focus to the linguistic case (2015: 127-8).
This raises some tricky issues, which we are as well to confront head on. Some pornog-
raphy is linguistic in form (e.g. Langton and West 1999: 184), but nowadays most takes the 
form of still or moving images. Despite this, much legal and philosophical work on pornog-
raphy is premised on the idea that pornography is speech, in which case it perhaps fits bet-
ter with Stanley’s focus than it seems to at first glance. However, the premise that pornog-
raphy is speech is one that should be handled with caution by anyone with any ambitions 
to argue against the orthodox liberal view of pornography. Langton is prone to suggesting 
that pornography’s opponents shouldn’t worry too much about whether it’s really speech, 
since there’s a dilemma here; if pornography is speech, then that legitimates the application 
of Austin’s theory of speech acts to it, and Langton has argued at length that such an appli-
cation supports MacKinnon’s claims that pornography subordinates and silences women; 
on the other hand, if pornography isn’t speech, then it can hardly be protected speech (e.g. 
Langton and West 1999: 176). However, this arguably trades on an ambiguity in the no-
tion of ‘speech’; pornography might be speech in a legal or technical sense even if it doesn’t 
count as speech by ordinary or speech-act-theoretic lights (Bauer 2006: 63-4). MacKinnon 
herself accepts the claim that pornography is speech ‘with reluctance’ (1994: x). Here I’ll 
follow suit, reluctantly accepting the premise in the hope that doing so enables us to shed 
light on pornography’s harmful nature and effects.
However, to take that to legitimate applying Stanley’s theory of propagandic language 
to the case of pornography would seem to involve ignoring the ambiguity in ‘speech’ again. 
Moreover, even when pornography does take linguistic form, there aren’t always close an-
alogues of the ‘code words’ central to Stanley’s analysis. So even if pornography counts as 
speech in some sense, I don’t think there’s much prospect of sensibly applying Stanley ac-
count of a central linguistic propagandic mechanism to it. That’s a pity, since as Stanley 
notes, the mechanisms involved in the linguistic case are relatively well-understood and can 
be described with relative precision. (2015: 128)
My aim in the next section is to draw on MacKinnon’s work on pornography to out-
line a different mechanism by which propaganda can work, this time one that depends cru-
cially on the media in question taking the form of images rather than words. I won’t aspire 
to anything like the level of precision that Stanley achieves in his discussion of ‘code words’ 
and at-issue/not-at-issue content, but I hope that some progress will be made nonethe-
less. In the final section I’ll go on to suggest that the particular mechanism that I’ll describe 
sheds new light on the authority of pornography, perhaps in a way that is helpful to those 
who want to advance a version of Langton’s silencing argument.
Pornography as Propaganda
In this section, I will draw on Catharine MacKinnon’s work, and that of those philoso-
phers that have defended her views, in order to describe one way in which pornography 
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might be seen to meet Stanley’s definition of undermining propaganda (once we relax his 
requirement that propaganda must be a contribution to public political discourse, as dis-
cussed above).
The idea, recall, is that pornography can be presented as embodying the ideals of equal-
ity and autonomy, while tending to undermine those very ideals. Let’s start with the much 
less surprising aspect of this thesis. We have already discussed the claim that pornography 
subordinates women, and we have noted its potentially problematic reliance on the premise 
that pornography is authoritative. However, we don’t need to defend such a strong claim 
here, since Stanley’s characterization requires only that undermining propaganda ‘tends to’ 
undermine the ideal that it superficially embodies. This indicates that the link can be causal 
in nature; in Langton’s preferred Austinian terminology, we can consider the perlocutionary 
effects of pornography rather than the illocutionary acts involved. This is advantageous for 
a number of reasons. The claim that pornography tends to lead to the treatment of women 
as subordinate can be supported on largely empirical grounds, and it is likely to enjoy much 
more widespread acceptance than MacKinnon and Langton’s further claim that pornogra-
phy is itself subordinating.8 Moreover, since we don’t need to defend the claim that pornog-
raphy is a kind of subordinating speech, one can support the claim that pornography is prop-
aganda in this way without relying on the premise that pornography is authoritative speech.
What about the more surprising aspect of the claim, namely that some pornography 
is presented as embodying the ideals of equality and autonomy? Given that by definition 
pornography involves the sexually graphic depiction of the subordination of women, and 
granting that it causes further subordination, how might it be presented as an embodiment 
of the ideals of equality and autonomy?
Let’s focus on equality first. A major theme in MacKinnon’s writings is that with the 
move from written pornography to pictures and videos, this depiction typically involves 
real women, and these women are depicted as enjoying acts we would otherwise usually rec-
ognize as subordinating.9 It’s in this way that pornography often represents itself as em-
8 For brief overviews of the empirical case that pornography leads to the harmful treatment of women, 
see Langton 1993: 39 fn33 and Finlayson 2016: 147-9. Following MacKinnon, Langton argues that 
‘[a] link between harm and subordination is made…when we shift our perspective on the asymmetric 
pattern of sexual violence and view it afresh, not simply as harm or as crime but as an aspect of wom-
en’s subordinate status’ (1993: 39). For an excellent, nuanced, and more recent discussion of the em-
pirical and theoretical issues involved in the claim that pornography harms women in a subordinat-
ing way, see Eaton 2007. Lorna Finlayson suggests that an apparent advantage of Langton’s arguments 
against pornography is that they offer to ‘bypass empirical questions of cause and effect (porn just is 
the harm of subordination and silencing)’ (2014: 778). I don’t think this is right, at least as Langton 
proceeds; part of the (defeasible) case she offers that MacKinnon is right about the illocutionary force 
of pornography is an inference to the best explanation of pornography’s apparent perlocutionary ef-
fects, and Langton explicitly draws on empirical work in detailing the latter (1993: 38-43).
9 There’s an assumption here that the women in pornography are pretending to enjoy (and perhaps even 
saying that they enjoy) acts that they don’t really enjoy. In the case of Deep Throat, discussed below, 
there’s some clear justification for this stance, given Boreman’s later account in Ordeal. But what’s the 
justification for generalizing beyond that particular case, treating the women who perform in pornog-
raphy as insincere or subject to false consciousness? That’s a very good question. One point we might 
make is that the pay structure for women in pornography financially incentivizes certain kinds of acts 
(Tarrant 2016: 52), and one way that non-mainstream pornographers (for example, feminist pornog-
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bodying the ideal of equality; women’s desires are realized just as men’s are, since these are 
complementary:
Pornography constructs what a woman is in terms of its view of what men want sexually, 
such that acts of rape, battery, sexual harassment, prostitution, and sexual abuse of children be-
come acts of sexual equality. Pornography’s world of equality is a harmonious and balanced place. 
Men and women are perfectly complementary and perfectly bipolar. Women’s desire to be fucked 
by men is equal to men’s desire to fuck women. All the ways men love to take and violate women, 
women love to be taken and violated. The women who most love this are most men’s equals, the 
most liberated… Their consent merely expresses or ratifies these preexisting facts. (1987: 171-2, 
endnote omitted)
Inequality is its central dynamic; the illusion of freedom coming together with the reality of 
force is central to its working. Perhaps because this is a bourgeois culture, the victim must look 
free, appear to be freely acting. Choice is how she got there. Willing is what she is when she is be-
ing equal. (1987: 172)
MacKinnon’s usual example is that of Linda Lovelace in Deep Throat, who was depicted by 
Linda Boreman as enjoying throat sex, though Boreman later went on to reveal the extent 
of the cruelty and threats to her and her family that were involved in getting her to perform 
in the film. Not only was subordination involved in the making of the film, Deep Throat 
has been claimed to caused other acts of subordination, some of it intentionally or uninten-
tionally violent (see e.g. MacKinnon 1987: 286 n65). And yet the film was explicitly pre-
sented and received as embodying the ideal of equality and autonomy; as Langton writes:
The pornographic film Deep Throat was hailed for representing women as sexually autono-
mous, its heroine described as “Liberated Woman in her most extreme form – taking life and sex 
on her own terms”. (2005: 225).
Put in Stanley’s terminology, MacKinnon’s suggestion is that the equality-undermining 
tendency of pornography is masked by the way it presents women as enjoying and choosing 
to be subjected to acts most people would likely otherwise recognise as subordinating (and 
often harmful), and so by the way it presents itself as embodying the ideal of equality. Like-
wise, Langton draws on MacKinnon’s discussion of Deep Throat to argue that pornography 
sometimes affirms women’s autonomy in a way that is ultimately autonomy-undermining:
Linda is not just a woman, but woman, ‘Liberated Woman in her most extreme for, taking 
life and sex on her own terms’: there is autonomy attribution here, a vision of what autonomy is, 
not just for Linda, but for women in the wider world. But it can be argued that this autonomy-af-
firmation serves autonomy-denial, a false vision of autonomy being, after all, among the most po-
tent enemies of autonomy. According to MacKinnon, and to testimony at the Minneapolis Hear-
raphers) have tried to improve things for performers in the industry is by paying a ‘flat rate’ to remove 
this kind of ‘pressure to do more for more money’ (2016: 29). But that’s hardly conclusive, and first-
hand reports from women performers concerning whether they enjoy the sexual acts they are filmed 
engaging in present a mixed picture (e.g. 2016: 59-61). I think it’s reasonable to hold that even if 
MacKinnon sometimes overstates the point, women are frequently depicted in pornography enjoying 
sexual behavior and acts that they in fact do not enjoy; I concede, though, that the issue deserves fur-
ther attention. Thanks to Fleur Jongepier for raising the worry.
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ings, the film legitimated a series of real-life autonomy-violations, provoking an increase in throat 
rape (with associated suffocation), and an increase in unwanted and sometimes coercive attempts 
at throat sex. In affirming women’s autonomy one way, and identifying that autonomy with sex-
ual freedom, Deep Throat style, it legitimated autonomy denial a different way, when the pornog-
rapher’s image of women’s choices was used to thwart real women’s choices.
Some pornography, I conclude, might objectify even as it affirms autonomy: indeed, it might 
objectify through its autonomy-affirmation, the way it objectifies depending on the distinctive 
way it affirms autonomy. (2005: 139-40)
I suggest we take MacKinnon and Langton to be making the case that some pornography is 
undermining propaganda, at least in our attenuated sense. Though this is an empirical mat-
ter, it seems plausible that much (though certainly not all) of pornography presents itself as 
an embodiment of the ideals of equality and autonomy in the way just described; MacKin-
non herself goes much further, describing pornography as ‘a whole industry in buying and 
selling captive smiling women, acting as if they like it’ (1994: 4). Moreover, the mechanism 
by which this pornography manages to undermine the ideals of equality and autonomy 
while presenting itself as embodying those ideals is potentially helpful for those who wish 
to defend the silencing argument against pornography—or so I’ll suggest in the next sec-
tion.
Authority and Silencing
The propagandic mechanism described in the previous section involves, crudely put, pre-
senting images (still or moving) of real women seeming to enjoy and choose acts that would 
typically otherwise be recognized as subordinating. What I’ll suggest is that reflection on it 
may yield a new response to the authority problem, one of the principal objections to the 
silencing argument. Recall the problem; Langton’s account of how pornography silences 
has it that some pornography counts as an exercitive speech act, which determines which 
speech acts women can make in sexual language games—which of her acts of refusal can se-
cure ‘uptake’, for example—and exercitives require the speaker to have a relevant sort of au-
thority. Langton is very clear about this implication of her argument:
If pornography sets up the rules in the language games of sex—if pornography is speech that 
determines the kind of speech there can be—then it is exercitive speech in Austin’s sense, for it is 
in the class of speech that confers and removes rights and powers. We saw that the claim that por-
nography subordinates requires the premise that pornography is authoritative speech, otherwise it 
could not rank and legitimate. We can now see that the claim that pornography silences requires 
the same premise: pornographic speech must be authoritative if it is to engender the silence of il-
locutionary disablement. (1993: 60)
However, whatever authority pornography possesses is presumably nothing like the author-
ity of the state, and some philosophers have been sceptical that we can specify an interesting 
and relevant sense in which pornography is authoritative (e.g. Green 1998, Bauer 2006: 76-
80). There have been several responses in the literature, some of which try to show that the 
premise that pornography is authoritative speech can be defended (e.g. Langton 1993: 44-
46, Maitra 2012), and some of which try to show that it isn’t needed (e.g. Hornsby 1993, 
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McGowan 2003).10 My aims here are constructive rather than polemical, and so I’ll make a 
new suggestion without attempting to compare and contrast it to the existing options.
That said, it will be useful to introduce the proposal by way of a contrast with a alter-
native considered briefly by Langton in a recent paper. This is the idea that perhaps por-
nography has the authority of apparent expertise on the subject matter in question, namely, 
the sexual desires and behaviour of women (Langton 2012b: 430). Now, perhaps this pro-
posal is plausible for some varieties of pornography—perhaps. As a proposal about por-
nography that involves depictions of real women, however, it seems a little odd. Such im-
ages are authoritative concerning the desires and behaviour of women, to the extent they 
are, not because there’s an illusion of expertise that attaches to pornographers (who I sus-
pect tend to be mostly out of sight and out of mind, from the consumers point of view), 
but because consumers of pornography can see women wanting and enjoying these things 
to be done to them. Not really, of course, if we side with MacKinnon; what they really see, 
if MacKinnon is right, is usually women ‘acting as if they like it’. The suggestion I want to 
make is that it’s the propagandic mechanism described above that explains why pornogra-
phy is treated as authoritative, namely a consumer of pornography ‘sees’ for himself what 
women want and enjoy by viewing images of women (apparently) wanting and enjoying 
those things.
That’s the proposal. It stands in need of much refinement and clarification, but even at 
this stage I hope that we can see that it has the potential to somewhat alter the terms of the 
debate over pornography’s authority. Langton writes (1993: 44):
[I]n order to answer the question, ‘Does pornography subordinate?’ one must first answer 
another: ‘Do its speakers have authority?’ If they do, then a crucial felicity condition is satisfied: 
pornographers’ speech acts may be illocutions that authoritatively rank women, legitimate vio-
lence, and thus subordinate.
This question is, I think, at the heart of the controversy. If you believe that pornographic ut-
terances are made by a powerless minority, a fringe group especially vulnerable to moralistic per-
secution, then you will answer negatively. Not so if you believe, with MacKinnon, that pornogra-
phy is the voice of the ruling power.11
It’s a consequence of the proposal I’ve made here that this may not be the right way to 
think of the issue about the authority of pornography, since these passages equate the au-
thority of pornography in a straightforward manner with the authority of pornographers. 
The alternative proposal is that pornographic speech is invested with whatever authority 
women themselves are taken to have about their own sexual preferences (though it gains 
this authority under false pretenses); from this perspective, it doesn’t matter much whether 
pornographers have any authority of their own.
10 These options aren’t intended to be either exhaustive or exclusive.
11 This raises a worry. Langton is here talking about MacKinnon’s claim that pornography subordinates 
women, rather than that it silences women. Does the proposal offered here give us a notion of author-
ity that can figure in a response to the authority problem as it arises with respect to the subordination 
claim? I’m inclined to think it does; as Maitra (2012) argues, the kind of authority required for speech 
to be subordinating can be relatively undemanding. But the issue needs much more attention than I’ve 
given it in this paper, given its importance. Thanks to Mike Ridge and Lucy Campbell here.
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Let me close by considering two of the most pressing objections to the proposal offered 
here (though I don’t mean to suggest that there aren’t other objections also in need of sus-
tained attention). The first objection is that people know that pornography features actors 
and actresses, and they don’t tend to think that what one does when acting in a film reflects 
one’s real beliefs and desires. Why would they have any tendency to make this kind of mis-
take when it comes to pornography?12
This issue deserves a more extended treatment than I can give it here, since we’re very 
close to the important but relatively underexplored question of the extent to which por-
nography counts as fiction. But I do want to note that even when we restrict our attention 
to pornographic films, pornography doesn’t always involve acting, and even when it does, 
it’s not at all clear that its consumers are clear that there is acting going on; as Shira Tarrant 
writes, ‘[t]he actor’s job is to make the scene appear authentic, accidental, or unscripted’ 
(2016: 60-1), and they may frequently succeed. The point is that pornographic films some-
times document sexual acts without anything that could or would be described as acting, 
and they sometimes (perhaps successfully) pretend to be nothing more than this kind of 
documentation. So I’m sceptical that pornography’s consumers standardly think of the 
performers as actors and actresses playing roles, in anything remotely akin to the way that 
we recognize that Will Smith played Agent J, a fictional character in Men in Black, and Dr 
Bennet Omalu, a real-life physician depicted in Concussion.
The second objection starts from the following very natural question: why is the verbal 
and non-verbal behaviour of women taken by men to reveal their true desires when they ap-
pear in pornography, when the behaviour of women is precisely not given this weight in sub-
sequent real-life sexual situations in which a women refuses sex?13 I don’t have a full response 
to this worry either, but I think that a promising line appeals once again to Stanley’s charac-
terisation of propaganda. This is the idea, absolutely central to his discussion but relatively ne-
glected in my discussion so far, that propaganda exploits and spreads flawed ideological beliefs:
Undermining propaganda is a claim that is presented as embodying a political ideal, but that 
is in the service of the kind of goal that tends to undermine that ideal. What this means is that the 
success of undermining propaganda depends on two things. First, it depends on people having be-
liefs that are resistant to the available evidence, the evidence that reveals the tension between goal 
and ideal. Secondly, since undermining propaganda conceals a contradiction of sorts, the beliefs 
that are resistant to evidence must themselves be flawed in some way. (2015: 178)
Now, MacKinnon sometimes seems to write as if pornography is almost singularly respon-
sible for constructing women as the second sex.14 Here I agree with Miranda Fricker’s claim 
12 My thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
13 MacKinnon (1987: 181) asks a perhaps related question: why was Linda Boreman’s performance in 
Deep Throat so much easier for men to believe than her subsequent report in Ordeal of what it took to 
make her engage in the acts depicted?
14 Eaton (2007: 683 fn25) suggests that MacKinnon has been misrepresented on this point, and offers 
some quotes which suggest MacKinnon holds a more moderate view. However, other passages do sup-
port the claim in the text above. For example: ‘Gender is sexual. Pornography constitutes the meaning 
of that sexuality. Men treat women as who they see women as being. Pornography constructs who that 
is. Men’s power over women means that the way men see women defines who women can be. Pornog-
raphy is that way.’ (1987: 148). Similar sentiments run through MacKinnon 1994 as well.
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that while this is to overstate the significance of pornography, there’s an insight here none-
theless:
[L]et me sound a note of qualification about MacKinnon’s uncompromising view. Her to-
talizing vision of the impact of such pornography on heterosexual relations, and gender relations 
more generally, is in my view luridly overstated in various respects. It essentializes the multifarious 
nature of women’s historical subordination to men as foundationally a matter of sexual subordi-
nation; it attributes to pornography too powerful an influence on the social construction of het-
erosexuality when many other cultural practices and institutions also have a powerful, and some-
times countervailing, influence; and, simply, it is excessively pessimistic in its portrayal of sexual 
and other social relations between men and women—a pessimism which here and there rings 
unpleasantly anti-men. None the less, the grim vision of relations between women and men does 
surely contain real insight into the effects that a corrupt sexual ideology, undoubtedly peddled in 
much pornography, can have not only on sexual but also on epistemic and discursive relations be-
tween men and women. (2007: 138)15
The insight in MacKinnon’s work that we should try to capture involves the idea that por-
nography exploits and spreads flawed sexual ideology, even if it need not be regarded as the 
original source of that ideology. That’s something we should expect if much pornography is 
propaganda in something like Stanley’s sense, given that the exploitation of existing flawed 
ideology is one of the characteristic features of such propaganda.
With this connection between pornography and flawed sexual ideology in mind, we 
can return to the objection to my proposal that I raised above; why are women taken to be 
credible regarding their sexual preferences when they perform in pornographic images and 
film, but not in real life when expressing contrary preferences? A partial answer, undoubt-
edly standing in need of considerable further elaboration and development, is that the per-
formances of women in pornography reinforce existing widespread flawed sexual ideology, 
while the women in subsequent sexual situations conflict with that ideology.
One might wonder where this response leaves us with respect to the silencing argu-
ment. If pornography amplifies rather than creates flawed sexual ideology, why single it out 
in the way that the silencing argument does?16 In response, we might argue that pornogra-
phy is a particularly effective signal-booster for certain sorts of ideology, due to the level of 
exposure that men in particular have to it, and the way in which it eroticizes the harmful 
messages it carries. Another possibility is that we might try to occupy some middle ground 
between MacKinnon and Fricker here; perhaps pornography exploits pre-existing misog-
ynist ideology, but is the source (or a principal source) of certain particularly harmful as-
pects of the dominant sexual ideology, particularly the so-called rape myths, and this might 
be enough to justify special treatment even while we acknowledge, with Fricker, that we 
shouldn’t overstate the significance of pornography.17
15 See also Bauer 2006, and Finlayson 2016: 161-6.
16 Katharine Jenkins raised this worry at a workshop in Vienna. Jason Stanley noted that Kate Manne has 
raised essentially the same point more generally against his discussion of propaganda, calling it ‘the ir-
relevance of propaganda’ objection.
17 Katharine Jenkins has pointed out to me that there is still a worry that the focus on pornography is un-
principled, since there may be other media that also peddle rape myths, such as some pop songs and 
literature. I think that’s right, but I don’t think that these kinds of overgeneralization worries are par-
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that some pornography can be seen as undermining propa-
ganda in something like Jason Stanley’s sense, and I have suggested that one way of elabo-
rating and defending this claim, due in essentials to MacKinnon, points to a novel response 
to the authority problem for the silencing argument.
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